2. Causes of the South African War (1899–1902)
The South African War of 1899 to 1902 - also known as the Second Boer War - had profound consequences for the future of South Africa as well as for the British - who faced international humiliation by its end in 1902. The reasons as to why the disagreements between the British and the Boers ended in a catastrophic military conflict leading to the deaths of over 50,000 people remains an area of debate amongst historians.
Why did tensions increase after the Jameson Raid?
What factors explain the outbreak of war?
What do historians say regarding the causes of war?
Watch the first seven minutes of this video
- What were some of the characteristics of the Second Anglo-Boer War?
- Why was this war such a disaster for Britain?
- What factors increased tension after the failed Jameson Raid?
Following the Jameson Raid, tensions remained between government of Kruger and the British. For the British, and specifically the Colonial Secretary, Chamberlain it was clear that it was still necessary to take action against the Transvaal:
- Chamberlain appointed Alfred Milner as Governor of the Cape and High Commissioner for South Africa (see photo on the left). Milner was an avowed 'race-patriot'
- Milner's task was to regain the diplomatic and political initiative against Kruger's republic and to isolate and denigrate the Transvaal government.
- Milner came to the view that for Britain to reassert her position in south Africa then Kruger's Transvaal would have to submit to British control. The question of the 'uitlanders' would be used as the excuse to achieve this. However, he was convinced that there was 'a greater issue than the grievances of the Uitlanders at stake...our supremacy in South Africa...and our existence as a great power in the world is involved.'
- Chamberlain (see photo on the right) and Milner re-established the propaganda campaign on behalf of the Uitlanders as a worthy English community denied their basic civil rights and ill-treated by the tyrannical Kruger regime
- The British dominated industry in the gold mines increased its practical backing for Chamberlain's and Milner's aggressive policies offering crucial financial support
- Chamberlain successfully encouraged the City of London to deny the Transvaal loans for long-term investment
- The British government represented by Milner arranged a conference at Bloemfontein in the Orange Free State as a public attempt to resolve differences between the Transvaal and Britain. Milner pushed for a 5 year franchise, retrospective, which Kruger resisted until the last day when he agreed but with conditions. Kruger wanted in return negotiations on the Raid indemnity, Boer control of Swaziland and arbitration on rival interpretations on the London Agreement of 1884. The extra conditions was all that Milner needed to end the proceedings. Kruger's comment on the failure of Bloemfontein was that what Milner wanted was not the franchise but his country.
- In July 1899 Kruger offered the concession of allowing uitlanders a seven year retrospective franchise that would enable substantial numbers of them to vote, as well as five new seats in the Volksraad, the Transvaal's parliament. However this was rejected
- Several attempts were made to avoid war. However, at the same time there was, as Judd and Surridge write, 'a grim determination to the push the crisis to the brink of war' (The Boer War, pg 49)
- By August 1899, both the Colonial and War Offices and the British imperial authorities in South Africa were preparing for war; during September, over 10,000 British and Imperial troops were stationed in South Africa
- The Orange Free State and the Transvaal presented an ultimatum calling for the withdrawal of these troops from the Transvaal borders, and for the recall of all reinforcements dispatched since June.
- In England the new popular press whipped up a war fever
- The ultimatum allowed Britain to present the Boers as the ones who were precipitating war. They ignored the ultimatum and when it expired on 11th October the two sides were at war.
It can be argued that Milner and Chamberlain were expecting Kruger to back down at the last minute when faced with the reality of actual war (see historians' views below). However it seems that Kruger never considered that the British were bluffing; he was convinced (as indicated by the Jameson Raid) that the British would not stop until they had ended the independence of the Transvaal. He was thus determined that the Boers would fight; in the 1890s arms had ben purchased from Germany in preparation for a war which Kruger and most of his supporters saw as 'inevitable'. Kruger was also encouraged in his resolve by the leading Boer generals - especially Smuts - who believed that the British could be defeated.
Using the information that you have covered so far, discuss in pairs or groups the impact of the actions of each of the following individuals or groups in causing the war:
- the uitlanders
- gold mine owners
- Kruger
- Rhodes
- Milner
- Chamberlain
What is the message of this cartoon?
It was produced in 1899 for the British Punch magazine and shows Paul Kruger, President of the Transvaal, asking Chamberlain, colonial secretary about his intentions.
Is it a fair portrayal of the actions of Joseph Chamberlain in the lead up to the outbreak of war?
'Dogs of War'
Kruger: 'May I ask if these dogs are intended for any special purpose?'
Chamberlain: 'Well, Guv'nor, that's as may be! Merely givin' 'em a little gentle exercise'
What according to each of these sources was most to blame for causing the outbreak of war?
Source A
British policy in the region since 1895 had been a failure. Despite its increasingly strident and menacing tone, the brinkmanship of Chamberlain's and Milner's diplomatic offensive had failed to deliver the goods - or, at least, the desired first option of a bloodless surrender by the Transvaal. The various concessions that had been demanded of the Kruger government were simply too great to be practical politics.
D Judd and K Surridge, The Boer War, Murray, 2002, pg 50
Source B
Salisbury [Prime Minister of Britain] and Chamberlain, like their new South African High Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner, were primarily concerned with political and strategic power. Control of South Africa was essential, they believed, for without it, Britain would lose the key naval base at Simonstown. This sat astride one of the world's most vital trade routes and as the War Office said, it would be impossible 'to create a Gibraltar out of the Cape Peninsular'.
Piers Brendon, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, Vintage, 2008, pg 215
Source C
Any erosion of British power was considered disastrous and not merely because of its consequences for the control of South Africa. Resolution of this problem had also become essential to maintaining confidence in Britain's ability to defend its vital imperial interests. For what was at issue was more than British prestige in Southern Africa or in Europe: it was the standing of its governance throughout the empire...therefore for Chamberlain, if the British position in South Africa was 'at stake', so was 'the estimate of our power and influence in our colonies and throughout the world.' If Paul Kruger provided a peephole into an imagined imperial abyss, the only way to block it was a convincing demonstration that defiance of British paramountcy would not pay. That made a showdown imperative.'
Bill Nasson. The Boer War, The History Press, 2010, pg 61
Using the information and sources above - also from the previous page - as well as your discussions from Task One above, copy out and complete the following mind map to show the role of each of the following in causing the war.
Then discuss in pairs - which of these factors do you consider to be most significant?
When you have read the historiography below, you may wish to add to the mind map.
Economic factors?
What about the role of the individuals?
Joseph Chamberlain and Sir Alfred Milner both played pivotal roles in creating the situation that led to war. However, Andrew Porter, writing in 'Lord Salisbury, Mr Chamberlain and South Africa, 1895 - 9', argues that Chamberlain did not push a reluctant cabinet or a reluctant Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, into war. A stronger case for responsibility can be made for Milner. He manipulated the press in both Britain and South Africa against the Transvaal, thus raising tensions and making compromise more difficult. His handling of the Bloemfontein Conference also destroyed any faith that Kruger had in British good will. Nevertheless, his views were not that far removed from the Salisbury, Chamberlain or the whole Cabinet of the British government - all of whom were eager to show, as Lord Salisbury put it, 'that we not the Dutch are Boss'. And most historians are now reluctant to suggest that either Chamberlain or Milner were actually planning for war. It seems that Milner, and most of his supporters, believed that Kruger would 'bluff up to the canon's mouth' and would then accept British demands. The failure of the Cabinet, Milner, the Colonial Office and War Office to make adequate preparation for a prolonged armed struggle certainly adds weight to this interpretation.
Most historians now come down on the view that political and strategic factors were key (see quote from Piers Brandon above) which resulted from the new economic power of the Transvaal. Cain and Hopkins write, 'Milner helped to stir the pot. He did not supply the ingredients'.